A rugby league club served a patron from a champagne breakfast through to the late afternoon. By 5pm she was grossly intoxicated and asked to leave. Twenty minutes later she was struck by a car on a nearby road. The question of whether the club owed her a duty of care divided the highest court in Australia.
This case is one of the most important Australian personal injury lawyers Queensland rely on when advising on licensed venue liability — and the limits of personal autonomy as a defence.
The plaintiff attended a champagne breakfast at the club at 9.30am, then spent the day drinking with around 150 others while watching football. By 11.30am she had bought a bottle of wine. By the afternoon she was heavily intoxicated and argumentative. At 3pm the club stopped serving her. By 5pm she was described as grossly intoxicated and was asked to leave.
Before she left, the manager offered her a courtesy bus or taxi. She refused both abusively. Two male companions said they would look after her. Twenty minutes later she was struck by a car on a nearby road, sustaining severe injuries.
She sued the club arguing that section 44 of the Registered Clubs Act 1976 — which made it an offence to serve an intoxicated person — created a duty of care requiring the club to take reasonable precautions against foreseeable harm arising from her intoxication. The club should have stopped serving her earlier, she argued, and should not have allowed her to leave without ensuring she got home safely.
Read the full judgment on the High Court of AustraliaThe plaintiff's case raised a genuine tension at the heart of negligence law: when does a commercial venue's obligation to manage the risks created by its own business override a patron's right to make their own choices, including bad ones?
Four justices found for the club, though their reasoning differed. Two found the duty of care didn't extend this far. Two others didn't even reach the duty question — they found that even if a duty existed, the evidence didn't establish the club had continued supplying alcohol to the plaintiff after she became intoxicated, and there was no evidence of what more the club could reasonably have done given it offered transport and her companions said they'd take care of her.
Two justices dissented. They found that a licensed venue's commercial interest in selling alcohol comes with a corresponding responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of that sale — and that a duty of care should have been recognised. This is a question that continues to be relevant in every workers compensation lawyers Gold Coast and licensed venue liability case that follows it.
The High Court split 4-2 in favour of the club, but the majority justices reached that outcome through different reasoning. Here's what each group said.
Both justices emphasised personal autonomy. A duty requiring licensed venues to monitor and control patrons' alcohol consumption would conflict fundamentally with individual freedom. Breaching a liquor licensing provision — which regulates the sale of alcohol and maintaining order in venues — does not automatically create a common law duty of care to protect patrons from the downstream consequences of their own intoxication.
These justices declined to decide whether the duty existed at all. Even assuming it did, the plaintiff failed on breach. There was no evidence the club had continued supplying alcohol to her after she became intoxicated — she could easily have obtained it from companions. More importantly, there was no evidence of what more the club could reasonably have done. It offered transport. Her companions vouched for her. The club had done what was open to it.
Justice McHugh found that an occupier's duty of care is not limited to static defects or physical hazards. It extends to the activities carried on at the premises. A licensed club's duty naturally extends to protecting patrons from the foreseeable harm arising from the club's own commercial activity — selling alcohol. The risk of a patron becoming heavily intoxicated was foreseeable and significant, and the duty required the club to act before she reached that state, not merely refuse service once she had.
Justice Kirby agreed with McHugh J on duty, foreseeability and breach. He added that licensed venues cannot commercially profit from selling alcohol to patrons and then disclaim all legal responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of that sale. He also looked to broader duty principles developing in Canada, arguing Australian law should follow a similarly expansive approach to occupier liability in this context.
Cole is the leading Australian authority on licensed venue liability for patron intoxication — and the tension it exposes between duty of care and personal autonomy remains unresolved.
The plaintiff argued that because the Registered Clubs Act made it an offence to serve an intoxicated person, that statutory prohibition should translate into a common law duty of care. The majority rejected this. The purpose of the statute was to regulate the sale of alcohol and maintain order in venues — not to create a private right of action for patrons harmed by their own intoxication.
A significant thread through the majority judgments is the principle that adults bear primary responsibility for the consequences of their own voluntary choices. Imposing a duty on licensed venues to supervise, monitor and control adult patrons' drinking would cut across personal freedom and autonomy in a way the majority was unwilling to accept — particularly where the patron had refused offers of safe transport.
Gummow and Hayne JJ's approach is particularly important for practitioners. Even accepting a duty, the plaintiff must demonstrate what specific precaution the defendant could and should have taken. General assertions that the venue "should have done more" are insufficient. The evidence must establish the precaution, why it was reasonable, and why it would likely have prevented the harm.
The 4-2 split — and the fact that two majority justices didn't even decide the duty question — means Cole does not definitively close the door on licensed venue liability. The minority judgments of McHugh and Kirby JJ remain live authority for the proposition that a duty can arise where a venue commercially profits from serving alcohol to a patron it knows is becoming dangerously intoxicated. Future personal injury lawyers Queensland may yet see this question revisited.
What makes Cole interesting is that the majority didn't agree on why the club should win. Two justices said there was no duty. Two others said there might be a duty but the evidence wasn't there for breach. That's a meaningful distinction — it means the question of whether licensed venues owe a duty of care to intoxicated patrons is not definitively settled in Australia, even after a High Court decision.
The personal autonomy argument is compelling up to a point. She refused the taxi. She refused the bus. Her companions said they'd look after her. At some point the club had done what was open to it. But the dissent raises the harder question: should a venue be able to commercially benefit from serving alcohol for hours, watch a patron become grossly intoxicated, and then rely on her own choices to escape liability entirely?
This is not an abstract debate. Liability of licensed premises comes up in personal injury claims regularly — whether the injured person is the patron, a third party, or someone else. Cole sets the current Australian position, but with a 4-2 split and two different majority reasonings, it leaves more room for argument than a cleaner decision would have.
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